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ABSTRACT 
 
Even though studies of supply-side populism are numerous, its connection with 
demand-side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the 
electorate, requires more scholarly attention. We seek to examine in more detail the 
conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of 
populist attitudes amongst citizens. We ask two core questions: (i) to what extent are 
populist party supporters characterised by populist attitudes, and (ii) to what extent do 
populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? For the analysis, we 
use fixed-effect models and rely on a cross-sectional research design that uses unique 
survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. Our results are threefold. 
First, in line with single-country studies, we conclude that populist attitudes are 
prominent amongst supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties in particular. 
Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support, in addition 
to left-wing socio-economic issue positions for left-wing populist parties, and 
authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions for right-wing populist parties. Third, 
we find that populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for 
populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from 
the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that 
strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose 
issue positions are incongruous with their own policy-related preferences. 
 
Keywords: populism, issue positions, populist attitudes, populist party support, cross-
national survey data 	 	
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise of populist parties in Europe has attracted considerable scholarly and 
journalistic attention. Parties associated with the term are typically characterised by an 
anti-establishment character and an appeal to popular sovereignty. At least in the West 
European context, they are usually located at the fringes of the ideological spectrum. 
Academic research sheds light on the character, as well as the electoral success and 
failure of populist parties – with most studies focusing on parties of the populist radical 
right, which in Europe is the dominant party family with populism as a defining 
characteristic (Mudde 2007; Pirro 2014). Many of these studies showed that a vote for 
populist parties is based on dissatisfaction with the political establishment, but also on 
ideological convictions and issue positions (see e.g. van der Brug et al. 2000; Schumacher 
and Rooduijn 2013).  
 
Various studies have thus considered how populist parties meet certain (electoral) 
demands of voters. What remains understudied, however, is the relationship between 
populist party support and populist attitudes (but see Stanley 2011; Akkerman et al. 
2014). Supporters of populist parties are typically dissatisfied with the political 
establishment, but do they also sign up to the broader principles of populism, such as its 
appeal to unmediated popular sovereignty? Furthermore, apart from the case of Slovakia 
(Stanley 2011) it has not been systematically assessed to what extent populist attitudes 
contribute to the (electoral) support for populist parties. In other words, do such 
attitudes matter in terms of party support, or is support for populist parties primarily 
driven by concrete issue positions or other factors? Using a cross-sectional design, our 
study asks whether populist party supporters are characterised by populist attitudes, and 
to what extent these attitudes contribute to their party preference, in addition to other 
(more policy-related) motivations. 
 
To answer these questions, we use survey data from nine European countries provided 
by the LIVEWHAT project. It is the first dataset that allows for the cross-national 
analysis of populist attitudes. Simultaneously, the dataset enables us to relate populist 
attitudes and policy-related preferences to party support. We provide extensive 
descriptive evidence and support our claims by designing a set of fixed effects models to 
help predict populist party support. This latter approach allows us to account for the 
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country-specific factors that may prompt populist attitudes and shape party preferences. 
Altogether, we come to three key findings. First, in line with single-country studies, we 
conclude that populist attitudes are prominent amongst supporters of left- and right-
wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of 
populist party support, in addition to left-wing economic issue positions for left-wing 
populist parties, and authoritarian and anti-immigration issue positions for right-wing 
populist parties. Third, we find that populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue 
positions on the support for both left- and right-wing populist parties, particularly for 
individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic 
or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may 
encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous 
with their own policy-related preferences. 
 
POPULISM: MATCHING VOTERS WITH PARTIES   
 
It is often noted that populism is a contested concept that is ill-defined, yet widely 
applied to a diverse range of movements, parties and actors throughout time and space 
(e.g. Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000). Scholars debate whether 
we should understand populism as an ideology or set of ideas (e.g. Mudde 2004; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Hawkins 2009), a form of political mobilisation or 
organisation (e.g. Weyland 2001; Roberts 2006), or rather as a political style (e.g. Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt and Tormey 2013). It is still true that a broad consensus on 
the meaning, contents or implications of populism is lacking, and an imprecise and 
inconsistent use of the term in the vernacular sphere further feeds into conceptual (and 
operational) confusion (cf. Bale et al. 2012; Aslanidis 2016).  
 
Many present-day scholars, however, take an ideational approach to the concept and 
broadly agree on populism’s attributes (Hawkins 2009; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2013; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014a). Accordingly, populism makes a Manichean distinction 
between the corrupt ‘elites’ and the virtuous ‘people’, and supports the idea of popular 
sovereignty. Following Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012: 8), we can argue that 
populism might have an ‘elective affinity with certain organisational aspects' such as 
charismatic leadership and unmediated representation, but that these are not defining 
properties of populism as such. The same can be argued for certain stylistic elements, 
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such as confrontational and simplistic language and the proposing of ‘sound-bite 
solutions’ (cf. Moffitt and Tormey 2013). These characteristics do not constitute 
elements of populism per se, but can instead be linked back to the ideational properties 
of populism, in particular populism’s antagonistic position vis-à-vis elites and its appeal 
to the ‘common’ people.  
 
An ideational approach to populism allows for the empirical measurement of populist 
positions of both individuals (demand side) and parties (supply side). Thus far, the focus 
in the literature has predominantly been on the latter, with scholars measuring degrees of 
populism by means of party documents and politicians’ speeches (Hawkins, 2009; Jagers 
and Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2014). This ‘degreeist’ approach 
implies that populism can in principle be found in the language of all political actors (to a 
certain extent) and that populism is not an exclusive feature of a set of ‘populist parties' 
(Rooduijn et al. 2014).  
 
Populism may indeed be a more general feature of certain political systems, particularly 
in those contexts where trust in political elites is low, such as in European post-
communist countries (see Učeň 2007; Stanley 2011), where confidence in traditional 
parties received a blow, like in the UK after the so-called expenses scandal (Ford et al. 
2012), or where there is a general antipathy towards centralised and big government, 
such as in the United States (see Kazin 1998; Ware 2002). Concerning the West 
European context, furthermore, Mudde (2004) has asserted that the emergence of radical 
right populist parties has induced mainstream parties to use populist rhetoric themselves. 
According to the same author, this contributes to a “populist Zeitgeist”; yet, this theory 
remains empirically contested (cf. Rooduijn et al. 2014). 
 
It is questionable, however, whether a ‘degreeist’ approach to the concept is always 
theoretically and analytically fruitful (cf. Sartori 1991; van Kessel 2014). Using the 
concept of democracy as an example, countries may vary in terms of the degree to which 
they comply with democratic ideals, but there is still value in building a typology of 
democratic and essentially non-democratic regimes types. The same holds true for 
populism, which has analytical value as ‘a concept of classification’. For some parties, 
populism is an essential element of their ideology rather than a sporadic (strategic) device 
used to put distance between themselves and the parties they compete with. Rooduijn et 
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al. (2014) showed that certain West European parties clearly stood out in terms of their 
expression of populist messages, while mainstream parties did not become more populist 
over time. Populism, in other words, has discriminating power: at least in the West 
European context, a meaningful distinction can often be made between populist and 
essentially non-populist parties. In our study, we take this approach and treat populist 
parties as a bounded category.  
 
While the academic debate concerning populism as part of the political supply side is 
well developed, the same cannot be said about populism as an individual-level 
characteristic. The body of research concerning populist expressions amongst citizens 
and voters is still relatively young and much less extensive. This may be seen as 
surprising, since, in addition to an element of politicians’ discourse or party ideology, 
populism can be thought of as an individual-level construct, most notably in the form of 
an attitude (Stanley 2011; Van Hauwaert et al. 2017). We deem this relevant, as populism 
as a latent attitudinal construct can conceivably play an important role in motivating 
party support and voting behaviour. Hence, the notion that populism also exists as part 
of the political demand side gives rise to some unanswered questions, most notably 
related to the impact and explanatory value of ‘populist attitudes’. 
 
To draw attention to the general composition of populist attitudes, recent scholarship 
developed several measurements that are gradually becoming standard items in the effort 
to gauge populist attitudes (cf. Hawkins and Riding 2010; Akkerman et al. 2014). Most of 
the existing studies using these items focus on the Americas (Hawkins and Riding 2010; 
Hawkins et al. 2012). As for Europe, there is currently only one published study 
employing similar items, which focuses on the Netherlands (Akkerman et al. 2014). 
Other studies examining populist attitudes in the European context typically use 
alternative items and have a limited country- or region-specific focus. Examples include 
studies of Slovakia (Stanley, 2011) and Flanders (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016), and of a 
single party, such as UKIP in the UK (Ford et al. 2012).  
 
Concerning the results of these studies, Hawkins et al. (2012), Elchardus and Spruyt 
(2016) and Akkerman et al. (2014) all find that populist attitudes are quite widespread 
amongst the national electorates. Several studies go beyond merely assessing the spread 
of populism amongst citizens, and link populist attitudes to party preferences (vote 
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choice). Despite different operationalisations, both the studies of Ford et al. (2012) and 
Akkerman et al. (2014) find that voters who score high on their respective populism 
scales are also more likely to support populist parties. Stanley (2011), on the other hand, 
finds that even though populist attitudes are widespread across the Slovakian electorate, 
their impact on electoral preferences is limited, particularly compared with more 
traditional vote predictors such as nationalist and economic attitudes.  
 
EXPLORING THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES 
 
While the studies listed above have provided valuable initial insights into the connection 
between populist attitudes and populist party support, they are somewhat limited as they 
rely on data from single countries, and often lack inferential evidence. At this moment, 
we still know little about the extent to which individuals with an affinity for populism 
prefer populist parties over other parties. Bearing this in mind, using data from multiple 
European countries, we aim to come to a closer understanding of the motives and 
attitudes underlying populist party support. 
 
The first question we seek to answer is to what extent populist voters (i.e. individuals 
with higher levels of populist attitudes) support populist parties, instead of other parties. 
Building on initial indications from single-country studies focusing on the USA (Hawkins 
and Riding 2010) and the Netherlands (Akkerman et al. 2014), we hypothesise this to be 
the case across European countries. After all, seeing how populism appears inherent to 
democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014b; Huber and Schimpf 2016a; 2016b), both 
previously mentioned studies on the USA and the Netherlands indicate that their 
findings could be generalised to other democracies. Just like we would expect individuals 
with liberal views to support liberal parties and people prone to nationalism to vote for 
nationalist parties, we argue that individuals with strong populist attitudes presumably 
support populist parties.  
 
H1: Supporters of populist parties are characterised by stronger populist attitudes than 
the supporters of more traditional party families.  
 
This initial question forms the foundation for further, more detailed and inferential 
claims regarding populist attitudes and party preferences. Notably, while we would 
expect populist attitudes to be stronger amongst populist party supporters, this would 
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not in itself provide evidence for the claim that these attitudes also shape populist voters’ 
party preferences. Therefore, our analysis also seeks to gauge the potential electoral value 
of populism: is it the populist nature of the parties that attracts voters, or can/should we 
explain their electoral support in different ways? While Akkerman et al. (2014) show a 
connection between Dutch voters’ populist attitudes and their preference for populist 
parties, we are not able to draw any inferential or substantive conclusions from this. 
Stanley (2011) does focus on the explanatory power of populist attitudes, finding little 
evidence that populism is an important vote determinant in Slovakia. Other studies use 
partial indicators of populism to conclude there is a positive association between certain 
components of populism and populist party support. For example, Ford et al. (2012) 
show that dissatisfaction with traditional parties in the UK contributed to a UKIP vote, 
while Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) conclude that protest attitudes constitute a 
significant predictor of populist party support in the Netherlands. Such variables, 
however, only provide a crude proxy for individual-level sentiments of, or affinity 
towards, populism. 
 
Overall, the sparse existing literature thus presents ambivalent evidence as to whether 
populist attitudes can be seen as a potential predictor of (populist) party support. Yet, 
this question is important if populist attitudes are indeed widespread. Furthermore, more 
accurate insights into the political implications of populist attitudes would allow us to 
further examine under which conditions (populist) parties can translate populist potential 
into (electoral) support. We expect that the strength of populist attitudes provides an 
individual-level mechanism that determines whether an individual opts for a populist 
party (in case the individual has strong populist attitudes) or a non-populist party (in case 
the individual has weak populist attitudes).  
 
H2: The stronger the populist attitudes of an individual, the more likely they are to 
support a populist party. 
 
Although we expect that populist attitudes stimulate the vote for all populist parties, we 
suspect the broader opinion structures of their supporters to vary, depending on the 
wider policy positions of a given populist party. This relates to the notion that populism 
can be seen as ‘chameleonic’, or defined as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, which makes 
normative claims about the functioning of democracy, but lacks judgements where it 
concerns concrete policy areas (see Taggart 2000, 2004; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). 
 8 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) argue that populism – as an ideological motivator – 
is in need of a more substantial ‘host ideology’ to become successful. Parts of existing, 
more comprehensive, ideologies can and should thus be added to the populist core for 
populist parties to mobilise. This is largely confirmed by empirical studies that highlight 
the importance of more policy-oriented considerations as part of populist party 
preference (cf. Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; Stanley 2011). This implies that populist 
party voters are not indifferent about the wider policy agendas of populist parties.  
 
In the European context, populism tends to be associated primarily with parties of the 
far right and far left (e.g. Mudde 2007; March 2011). The former are primarily 
characterised by their culturally conservative and authoritarian positions (concerning 
issues such as immigration and law and order), while the latter focus more on socio-
economic issues and express anti-capitalist views. In our analysis, we therefore separate 
the supporters of socio-economically left-wing and culturally right-wing populist parties 
(cf. footnote five), and consider whether populist attitudes still predict political support 
when we control for the economic position of left-wing populist party supporters and 
the cultural position of right-wing populist party supporters. At the same time, we do 
expect that, besides populist attitudes, economically left-leaning issue positions 
encourage support for a left-wing populist party, while right-wing positions on cultural 
issues stimulate the support for a right-wing populist party (e.g. Cutts et al. 2011; 
Ivarsflaten 2008; March & Rommerskirchen 2015; Ramiro 2016; van der Brug et al. 
2005; Visser et al. 2014). 
 
H3a: Left-wing economic issue positions increase the likelihood of supporting a left-wing 
populist party over any other party. 
H3b: Right-wing cultural issue positions increase the likelihood of supporting a right-
wing populist party over any other party. 
 
Altogether, we believe that an individual’s affinity with populism and agreement with a 
populist party’s issue positions are important contributors to populist party support. At 
the same time, we doubt that these two mechanisms operate independently from one 
another, as is often assumed in the literature (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008; Schumacher and 
Rooduijn 2013; Stanley 2011). First of all, we recognise that populist attitudes and issue 
positions may not be equally important party choice mechanisms for all individuals (e.g. 
Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). In addition, the weight and effect of such mechanisms 
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often depends on intervening factors, whose impact varies between individuals (e.g. 
Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Jacoby 1991; Rudolph and Evans 2005; van der Eijk et 
al. 2005). Translated to our study, the effect of issue positions on populist party support 
may well differ between voters, depending on how populist an individual is.   
 
We can further explain our expectations as follows. Even when individuals are attracted 
by the policies of populist parties, they may still opt for a different party competing on 
the basis of a similar policy agenda. Differently put, our previously formulated 
hypotheses (H3a-b) require some adjustment in order to explain why some individuals 
opt for a populist party, whereas others do not. While this could simply be related to 
individual differences in populist attitudes (an additive effect), we theorise that populist 
attitudes also condition the effect of policy considerations on populist party support. While 
we expect that policy preferences have an independent effect on populist party support, 
we further posit that the relationship varies as a function of an individual’s populist 
attitudes. 
 
We argue that this conditional effect can be directly linked to the essence of populism. 
The antagonistic and dualistic nature of populism allows individuals to fit most policy-
oriented attitudes within a populist anti-establishment framework. Populist criticism of 
political elites and politics in general is often centred on perceived policy failure, not the 
least in areas such as immigration (in case of right-wing populists) or wealth distribution 
(in case of left-wing populists) (e.g. Mudde 2007; March 2011; van Kessel 2015). With 
respect to our argument, this implies that while individuals may, for instance, have similar 
views on socio-economic inequality or immigration, their perception of who is 
responsible for perceived problems (e.g. the elite) will affect whether they choose a 
populist party or a more traditional, non-populist party. Differently put, we suggest that 
policy considerations can serve as populism’s ‘host ideology’, thereby essentially allowing 
populist attitudes to condition the likelihood that policy considerations result in a 
populist vote. We then expect that at higher levels of populism, the effect of policy 
considerations on the populist vote increases.  
 
In sum, we expect that populist attitudes and issue positions do not operate as two 
independent mechanisms, but rather that populist attitudes condition, and thus 
moderate, the effect of issue positions on populist party support. When holding issue 
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positions constant (at their mean), we expect that individuals with strong populist 
attitudes show a higher probability to support a populist party than individuals with weak 
populist attitudes. Vice versa, we expect the average marginal effect of congruous issue 
positions on populist party support to be positive, even when populist attitudes are at 
their lowest level. We expect the size of this effect to increase, as populist attitudes grow 
stronger.   
 
H4a: The stronger populist attitudes become, the stronger the effect of left-wing 
economic issue positions on the support for left-wing populist parties. 
H4b: The stronger populist attitudes become, the stronger the effect of right-wing 
cultural issue positions on the support for right-wing populist parties. 
   
To recapitulate, we started our study with the specification that populism is not 
necessarily restricted to the political supply side, but that it can also be found as an 
attitude amongst citizens. However, the question remains to what extent there is a match 
between the populist character of parties and the populist attitudes of individuals. We 
propose to study this using a threefold analysis. First, we describe the characteristics and 
opinion structures of populist party supporters, and consider in particular whether these 
individuals are characterised by above-average levels of populist attitudes. Second, by 
means of a unique cross-sectional research design we determine which factors correlate 
with populist party support, considering in particular populist attitudes and issue 
positions. Third, we examine whether there is a conditional association between issue 
positions and populist attitudes when explaining populist party support. 
 
DATA, INSTRUMENTS AND METHOD 	
We use data from an original cross-national survey (n = 18,368) that was conducted 
between June and August of 2015 as part of the LIVEWHAT project.2 The dataset 
includes nationally representative samples (n = +/- 2,000) of nine European countries 
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, UK). All national 
samples are quota samples that match national population statistics concerning gender, 
region, age and educational attainment. 
 																																																								
2 The project “Living with Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises and Their Social and 
Political Consequences” (LIVEWHAT) received funding from the European Union’s 7th Framework 
Programme under grant agreement n° 613237.  
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Dependent variable 
 
To assess the association between populist attitudes and populist party preference, it is 
necessary to determine which parties fall into the populist category. The recent study of 
van Kessel (2015) provides a comprehensive overview and identifies the populist parties 
in Europe that gained parliamentary representation in elections between 2000 and 2013. 
Parties were considered populist if they consistently ‘(1) portray[ed] ‘the people’ as 
virtuous and essentially homogeneous; (2) advocate[d] popular sovereignty, as opposed 
to elitist rule; and (3) define[d] themselves against the political establishment, which is 
alleged to act against the interest of ‘the people’’ (van Kessel 2015: 33). 
 
To include populist parties at the time of the survey, we expand on van Kessel's (2015) 
initial account. Given the available answer categories of a prospective vote choice 
variable (election tomorrow), we identify 15 populist parties3: National Front (FN) 
(France); Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left (Linke) (Germany); Five Star 
Movement (M5S), Forza Italia (FI) and Northern League (LN) (Italy); UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) and British National Party (BNP) (United Kingdom); Law and Justice (PiS) 
and Kukiz’15 (Poland); Sweden Democrats (SD) (Sweden); Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
(Switzerland); LAOS and SYRIZA (Greece) and Podemos (Spain).4  
 
Given that populist parties vary regarding their broader ideological attributes – which 
certainly also applies to the parties included in our study – it would not be accurate to 
speak of a single ‘populist party family’, in the same way as we would refer to a liberal or 
a socialist party family. In our study, we nevertheless aim to assess whether it is the 
populist component of these parties that has explanatory value as far as party support is 
concerned. However, since we also aim to examine the effects of issue positions in a 																																																								
3 We rely on a prospective vote choice variable because we want to capture current attitudes towards 
parties and minimise recollection bias. Additionally, the prospective vote variable includes parties like 
Podemos and M5S, whereas the more traditional retrospective vote variable (last national election) does 
not. We consider the benefit of these two additional populist parties outweigh the potential criticism 
scholars might have on our choice of a prospective over a retrospective vote choice variable. Nonetheless, 
we validate our results by also using the retrospective vote variable as a dependent variable, and our 
principal conclusions remain the same. 
4 The AfD and PiS can be considered borderline cases of populism. The former turned into a more clear-
cut populist direction only after the 2013 German federal election (cf. Arzheimer 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 
2016), whereas the latter can be characterised by varying levels of populism throughout time (van Kessel 
2015). As a robustness check, we ran a separate analysis without these parties, and our substantive results 
remain the same. Other potential populist parties, like the Front de Gauche in France, were not included in 
the survey’s potential answer categories because their relevance was deemed minimal. We provide a basic 
overview of populist and non-populist party supporters per country in Appendix III (Table III.A). 
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subsequent step of our analysis, we further distinguish between two main types of 
populist parties: (culturally) right-wing populist parties and (economically) left-wing 
populist parties. The first category includes FN, AfD, FI, LN, UKIP, BNP, PiS, 
Kukiz’15, SD, SVP, and LAOS; the second includes die Linke, M5S, SYRIZA and 
Podemos.5 This categorisation is admittedly rough: the M5S differs from the other left-
wing cases in having a more ambiguous, and less socialist, ideological profile; the FI and 
PiS rely less on nativist appeals in comparison with the other right-wing cases. Since the 
Italian M5S and FI are the least ‘typical’ populist left- and right-wing parties, we cross-
validated our results by excluding them from our analysis. The substantive interpretations 
remained the same. 
 
For the purpose of identifying and comparing the strength of populist attitudes amongst 
supporters of various types of parties, we operationalise party families based on the 
prospective vote choice variable and a reduced implementation of the ZEUS party family 
classification scheme. We slightly changed this to allow for the identification of populist 
parties, and to compare these to some of the more traditional party families. Overall, we 
distinguish between the following types of parties: socialists, liberals, Christian 
democrats, conservatives, right-wing populist parties, left-wing populist parties and 
‘other’ parties.6  
 
Independent variables  
 
Conceptually, this study proposes two core explanatory constructs that can influence 
populist party support: populist attitudes and issue positions. To measure populism, we 
propose to harmonise eight separate items [see Table 1]. Six of these items stem from the 
populism items originally developed by Hawkins and Riding (2010), which largely 
correspond to those used by Akkerman et al. (2014). We select the items that, in the 
latter study, loaded significantly on the populist dimension (POP1-5, POP7). 
																																																								
5 Certain right-wing populist parties are also characterised by left-wing economic stances (at least in some 
areas). We choose to classify these parties as primarily right-wing because their cultural positions are most 
salient and primordial for individuals to support them, while their economic positions often remain 
secondary (e.g. Minkenberg 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008).  
6 For more information on the classification scheme and further per-country specifications, we refer to 
Appendix I. 
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Furthermore, we add two unique items that proved to increase the validity of our 
populist measure.7 
 
[Insert Table 1: Question-wording populism items] 
 
All individual items consist of 5-point Likert scales, with higher values indicating higher 
levels of populist attitudes (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). 8  Since one of our primary 
assumptions is the existence of manifest populist attitudes at the individual level, we 
estimate this proposed construct by means of item response theory (IRT). 9  This 
particular technique has a number of advantages over the more traditional estimation 
methods.10 Most notably, IRT allows both the concepts of reliability (information) and 
measurement error to fluctuate across the latent variable, thereby basically increasing 
measurement accuracy. It is also worth noting that IRT item properties are invariant, 
meaning that estimated parameters should remain mostly stable in the absence of non-
random variance, even when the items are fielded amongst different populations. 
 
We also measure issue positions by estimating two separate policy dimensions of the 
political spectrum. We construct a scale for each dimension, based on CFA estimates. 
For economic issue positions, we rely on five items asking about equality, competition, 
taxes and the role of government (Cronbach's alpha = 0.59). For cultural issue positions, 																																																								
7 Van Hauwaert et al (2017) use item response theory and find that (i) items five, seven and eight are the 
most informative items of a latent populist construct, and (ii) using this particular 8-item scale, while 
perhaps not the most parsimonious, increases the quality of a populist measurement. 
8 While the (internal) consistency between the responses to our populist items is high, we do not rely on a 
(weighted) additive or summed index to measure populism. The initial distributions of the items are quite 
skewed to the right, suggesting a ceiling effect. This would indicate a sizeable loss of variance, particularly 
at the lower ends of any additive or summed scale (cf. DeVellis 2012). When simply summing items, the 
issue of latent variable indeterminacy remains (cf. Bollen, 2002). A more careful and extensive IRT analysis 
of these items further indicates there are substantial within-item differences (information) that would 
otherwise be lost. Therefore, for these particular items, we warn against using an additive or summed scale 
when doing inferential research, at the risk of bringing forward inaccurate results that are not able to 
provide fine distinctions between individuals or groups of individuals. 
9 We also test for between-country measurement invariance in the form of differential item functioning 
(DIF). While such tests are extensive (e.g. Davidov 2009; Davidov et al. 2014; Stegmueller 2011), we rely 
on three initial tests to justify our cross-national estimation (cf. Millsap 2012). First, we can confirm 
configural equivalence, meaning our latent models share the same factor structure across countries. 
Second, we can reject non-uniform DIF (metric non-invariance), i.e. our items are not systematically more 
related to the latent construct for individuals from one country compared to individuals from another 
country. Third, we can also partially reject uniform DIF (scalar non-invariance), meaning that only certain 
items (three out of eight) are systematically more difficult or severe for individuals from one country 
compared to individuals from another country. Several scholars have indicated partial scalar invariance is 
sufficient for cross-national comparisons (Byrne et al. 1989; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). 
10 For a detailed overview of scale construction in general and some of the main advantages of IRT more 
specifically, we refer to Kankaras et al. (2011), Raju et al. (2002) and Reise (1993). 
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we also rely on five items, mostly regarding authority concerns (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.48). Each item is composed of an 11-point answer scale, with higher values indicating 
either more economically liberal or culturally conservative positions.11  
 
We also include a number of control variables that could explain either the cultivation of 
populist attitudes or populist party support. Seeing how research on populist attitudes is 
only a recent phenomenon, the literature on populism as such does not provide 
conclusive evidence for most of these suggested mechanisms. First of all, populist 
attitudes can serve as an example of grievance theory (cf. Gurr’s 1970). Therefore, we 
include indicators for objective (income) and subjective deprivation, which in the 
literature have often been correlated with right-wing populist party support in particular 
(e.g. Rydgren 2012). We could also argue that populist attitudes, and their translation into 
populist party support, are directly related to different forms of dissatisfaction (Rooduijn 
et al. 2016). We thus include social and political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and 
dissatisfaction with how governments handled the economic and immigration crises. 
Further, populist party voters are often portrayed as uninterested and uninstructed 
protest voters (Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; but see van der Brug et al. 2000), so we 
control for political interest and efficacy. Concerning right-wing populist party support in 
particular, prejudice towards immigrants often serves as a complementary explanatory 
mechanism (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008). Hence, we include both economic and 
cultural prejudice. We further control for partisan affiliation and account for a standard 
set of socio-demographic variables, namely gender, age, age squared, education, 
subjective domicile, household size and marital status.12  
 
Method 
 
As respondents are nested within countries, we account for the effects of country-level 
dynamics using hierarchical logistic modelling (Bryk and Raudenbusch 1992; Hox 2010). 
The most common approach for this would be multilevel (random effects or mixed) 																																																								
11 When we examine in more detail the distributions of the economic issue positions scale for left-wing 
populist party supporters (n = 1,847) and the cultural issue positions scale for right-wing populist party 
supporters  (n = 2,527), both location (skewness) and variability (kurtosis) measures indicate near-normal 
distributions. Furthermore, this indicates we can also find important proportions of our sample sizes at the 
tails of our distributions. For more information on the original items and the question wordings of our 
independent variables, we refer to Appendix II. 
12 For descriptive statistics of our independent and control variables, we refer to Tables III.A to III.C in 
Appendix III. 
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modelling; however, considering we only examine nine countries, this is likely to be 
problematic. It would restrict the degrees of freedom at the country-level, which in its 
turn would negate many of the advantages of MLM, and increase omitted variable bias. 
Combined, this would negatively bias our estimates, as well as their standard errors and 
their confidence intervals – particularly at the country level (Hox 1998; Stegmueller 
2013). Altogether, that would increase the likelihood of level-I errors (cf. Zorn 2001). 
 
We therefore rely on fixed effect models in lieu of multilevel modelling (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002; Allison 2009). The fixed effects allow us to control for the effect of country-
specific features on the dependent variable, even when the number of countries remain 
limited.13 Fixed effect modelling has some further particular advantages. For one, given 
that country-specific error terms are treated as a set of fixed numbers estimated in the 
model, it becomes irrelevant whether the error terms are independent of other variables. 
This provides a particular advantage over the assumed normality and independence of 
country-specific error terms in multilevel modelling (Hox et al. 2010). So, whereas 
multilevel models risk having biased parameters in case important between-group 
differences go unmeasured (Chaplin 2003; Clarke et al. 2010; Murnane and Willett 2011), 
fixed effects models account for general between-group effects (i.e. country-level 
variability), and thereby reduce omitted variable bias. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Through a descriptive analysis, we first take a closer look at the mean level of populist 
attitudes found in different prospective party choice categories. Figure 1 allows us to 
make two notable observations.14 First, traditional (mainstream) party supporters appear 
to hold below-average levels of populist attitudes. This is an expected outcome: 
traditional parties are typically considered part of the political elite, and are unlikely to 
attract the support of individuals with strong populist (and thus also anti-elitist) attitudes. 
Second, left- and right-wing populist parties tend to attract the support from individuals 
with strong populist attitudes. In other words, we find that individuals with above-
																																																								
13 We have replicated our models by means of simple country-by-country logit models and found similarly 
significant results. Individual country results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
14 When we further disaggregate Figure 1 per country, our observations are confirmed [see Table I.C in 
Appendix I].  
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average levels of populist attitudes are clearly overrepresented amongst the supporters of 
populist parties. 
 
[Insert Figure 1: Average estimates of populist attitudes, per party family] 
 
Overall, and in line with the first hypothesis, the differences between traditional and 
populist party supporters are considerable, and appear to suggest that populist supply 
meets a populist demand. While this is in line with some of the recent country-specific 
studies (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014), we are now able to further confirm this observation 
cross-nationally.  
 
Figure 1, however, does not reveal anything about the potential effect populist attitudes 
can have on (populist) party preferences. Through a set of fixed-effects logistic models 
we therefore examine whether populist attitudes may also motivate individuals to 
support populist parties. Given that the literature tells us there are likely differences 
between left- and right-wing populist party voters as far as their policy-related 
motivations are concerned (Ivarsflaten 2008; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; Visser et 
al. 2014), we provide separate models for left- and right-wing populist party supporters. 
In other words, we examine whether populist attitudes and issue positions, as well as a 
number of alternative variables, have a different effect on the probability to support 
either a left-wing or a right-wing populist party.  
 
In a preliminary step, we only model socio-demographics so as to ‘describe’ the populist 
party supporter and provide some insights into his or her identity (models 1a-b).15 The 
results show that left-wing populist party supporters tend to fall into lower income and 
lower class categories, which can be seen as objective and subjective economic 
indicators, respectively. While European scholarship typically theorises the connection 
between populism and class dynamics in studying the populist right (cf. Rydgren 2012), 
our results suggest that economic indicators also predict the left-wing populist vote. 
Unlike left-wing populist party supporters, right-wing populist party supporters tend to 
be male and less educated (cf. Bovens and Wille 2009).  
 
																																																								
15 For all full models (models 1 to 3), we refer to Appendix IV. 
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We subsequently include the relevant predictors in a second set of models that also 
include behavioural variables (models 2a-b). For reasons of clarity, Figure 2 depicts the 
average marginal effects (AMEs) for both left- and right-wing populist party support.16 
While we can observe some notable differences between the predictors of the support 
for the populist left and right, we see that populist attitudes – in both instances – serve as 
an important predictor. They increase the probability of populist party support, meaning 
that – translated into odds ratios – for a one unit increase in populist attitudes we expect 
to see a 35 and 20 per cent increase in the odds of an individual supporting a left- and a 
right-wing populist party, respectively. While we recognise that the difference between 
these odds ratios might be partially due to the specific cases included in our study, we 
find general support for hypothesis 2: the stronger the populist attitudes of an individual, 
the more likely they are to support a populist party. 
 
[Insert Figure 2: Average marginal effects of models 2a and 2b] 
 
While this finding is not surprising in itself, with our unique and comprehensive 
operationalisation of populist attitudes we have been able to go beyond the findings in 
the existing literature. Namely, we are able to distinguish the concept of populist 
attitudes from political distrust, dissatisfaction with politics or democracy, and protest or 
anti-establishment feelings by controlling for these alternative mechanisms. In line with 
some more theoretical accounts, we therefore find evidence suggesting that populist 
attitudes are a unique empirical construct, and that they have a separate and substantially 
relevant impact on populist party support (cf. Hawkins 2009).   
 
When we look more closely at some of the alternative mechanisms in Figure 2, two 
similarities stand out. First, both left- and right-wing populist party supporters are more 
likely to have higher levels of political interest. We thus posit that populist party 
supporters are not typically politically apathetic or unaware of political developments. 
This directly contradicts interpretations of populist party support as the result of a simple 
protest mechanism for uninformed voters (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). 
Furthermore, seeing how it is possible to interpret political interest as a motivational 
prerequisite for political participation (delli Carpini and Keeter 1997), we can argue that 
																																																								
16 We excluded party identification from the coefficient plot because the size of the coefficient is 
disproportionate (yet significant) with all others. 
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political interest actively contributes to populist expressions. In short, our results indicate 
that populist party support may be a purposeful action by politically invested and 
interested voters.  
 
Second, both left- and right-wing populist party supporters share lower levels of 
satisfaction with democracy. This finds substantial support throughout the literature and 
speaks directly to the core of populism, namely as an expression of (political) antipathy 
and disenfranchisement (Roberts 2006; Webb 2013). Even more, as we noted before, 
dissatisfaction (with democracy) is even routinely used as a crude proxy for populism 
(Ford et al. 2012).  
 
However, beyond this, the two groups of voters mainly show different motivational 
dynamics. Individuals who are more prejudiced towards immigrants – regardless of 
whether this has economic or cultural foundations – are more likely to support right-
wing populist parties, whereas less prejudiced individuals are more apt to support left-
wing populist parties. Similarly, those who are more dissatisfied with how the 
government handled the immigration crisis are more prone to support right-wing 
populist parties, and less inclined to support left-wing populist parties.  
 
When we examine the predictive value of issue positions, we find that – generally 
speaking – policy matters for populist party supporters (March and Rommerskirchen 
2015; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; van Kessel 2015). We do observe important 
differences between left- and right-wing populist party supporters. Individuals who are 
culturally left leaning (liberal) are more likely to support a left-wing populist party, while 
those who are more authoritarian are more likely to support a right-wing populist party. 
At the same time, while left-wing economic issue positions contribute to the likelihood 
of left-wing populist party support, we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the 
economic preferences of right-wing populist party supporters. We recognise this might 
be due to the composition of the 'right-wing populist' category, which comprises a 
mixture of economically liberal (e.g. FI) and more protectionist (e.g. FN; PiS) parties. 
Alternatively, this finding could also indicate that economic issues are of secondary 
importance to most populist (radical) right-wing voters (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008). 
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Taken together, the findings support hypotheses 3a-b: individuals with left-wing 
economic issue positions are more likely to support left-wing populist parties – although 
we also find that culturally liberal issue positions contribute to populist left-wing party 
preference – while individuals with authoritarian preferences and anti-immigrant 
attitudes are more likely to support right-wing populist parties. Altogether, these findings 
demonstrate that, besides populist attitudes, populist parties’ policy positions are also 
relevant when explaining populist party support in a cross-national setting.  
 
[Insert Table 2: Fixed-effects models for populist party support, with interaction terms] 
 
The theory previously outlined in this study suggests that, in addition to their 
independent effects, populist attitudes condition (moderate) the effect of issue positions 
on populist party support. We expected to find positive interaction terms for both left- 
and right-wing populist party support. Table 2, however, returns some inconsistent 
evidence regarding our hypotheses.  
 
On the one hand, we find initial evidence in support of hypothesis 4a. The statistically 
significant interaction term indicates that populist attitudes condition (moderate) the 
effect of economic issue positions on the support for left-wing populist parties. On the 
other hand, we do not find evidence that populist attitudes condition the relationship 
between cultural issue positions and the support for a right-wing populist party. Without 
further analysis, this leads us to conclude that policy- and populist mechanisms both 
have distinct and separate explanatory power for right-wing populist party support, but 
also that, inconsistent with hypothesis 4b, there is no evidence of an interaction effect 
between the two mechanisms. 
 
[Insert Figures 3a-b: The interaction between populist attitudes and issue positions for 
left-wing populist party support] 
 
When we consider our results more closely, however, we have to abandon our theoretical 
expectations pertaining to both hypotheses 4a and 4b. We expected strong populist 
attitudes to strengthen mainly the effect of left-wing economic positions on the support 
for left-wing populist parties, on the one hand, and the effect of right-wing cultural 
positions on the support for right-wing populist parties, on the other. Our results, 
however, suggest there is quite a different mechanism at work. We elaborate on this by 
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visualising both interaction terms by means of their average marginal affects (AMEs) and 
their predicted probabilities.   
 
Figure 3a shows the AME of economic policy preferences on the probability to support 
a left-wing populist party, and indicates variation in effect size across the full range of 
populist attitudes. The initial effect of economic policy preferences is negative when 
populist attitudes are low, but the upward slope suggests the AME goes to zero when 
populist attitudes increase. While the average marginal effect remains negative, it 
decreases in magnitude for individuals with higher levels of populist attitudes. This 
indicates that as an individual becomes more populist, his or her economic policy 
preferences will play less of a role when supporting a left-wing populist party.  
 
The results thus show that populist attitudes moderate the effect of economic policy 
preferences on the support for left-wing populist parties, but not exactly in line with our 
theoretical expectations. To assess more precisely the mechanism at work, we also plot 
the predicted probabilities for the range of economic policy preferences. Figure 3b 
illustrates that the effect of economic preferences on left-wing populist party support is 
conditional on populist attitudes.17 It reveals that for those with left-wing economic 
preferences (the upper line), strong populist attitudes do not significantly increase the 
likelihood of supporting a left-wing populist party. For the other two levels, more 
centrist and right-wing economic policy preferences, the effect behaves as expected: an 
increase in populist attitudes significantly increases the probability to support a left-wing 
populist party.  
 
Thus, these findings suggest that the observed conditional effect is particularly (or only) 
existent when an individual is characterised by more economically moderate or right-
wing economic preferences. This is interesting as it can contribute to explaining why 
some voters with economically moderate or right-wing policy preferences support a left-
wing populist party. Our findings suggest that, despite the incongruence between 
																																																								
17 Since it is difficult to visualise an interaction between two continuous variables, we choose to show three 
interesting levels of policy preferences, namely the mean minus two standard deviations (left-wing 
economic policy preferences), the mean (centrist economic policy preferences) and the mean plus two 
standard deviations (right-wing economic policy preferences). Further investigations lead us to conclude 
that populist attitudes only matter for respondents with economic policy preferences greater than two on 
our 11-point scale (see also Appendix V, Figure V.1). 
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personal economic policy preferences and the party’s economic platform, voters may still 
prefer a left-wing populist on the basis of their populist attitudes.  
 
Overall, this indicates that populism has the potential to serve as a ‘motivational 
substitute’, and does not, as we expected, primarily serve as a reinforcing mechanism for 
those individuals whose policy preferences are congruous with those of the left-wing 
populist party. Thus, as the predictive value (probability) of an individual’s (left-wing) 
economic issue position decreases, populist attitudes may serve as an alternative 
motivational mechanism that helps determine left-wing populist party support. For 
individuals with more centrist or right-wing socio-economic convictions, strong populist 
attitudes may still sway such persons to cast a left-wing populist vote. On the other hand, 
for those individuals who show a limited affinity with populism, economic policy 
considerations are really what matters when explaining their support for a left-wing 
populist party. Regardless of their levels of populist attitudes, these respondents will have 
a relatively consistent probability of endorsing left-wing populist parties based on their 
issue positions. 
 
[Insert Figures 4a-b: The interaction between populist attitudes and issue positions for 
right-wing populist party support] 
 
As we initially gathered from Table 2, the interaction term for right-wing populist party 
support is negative (as expected), but not significant. Yet, to truly get to the bottom of 
this conditional effect, and subsequently draw accurate inferences, Brambor et al. (2006) 
suggest plotting the interaction even if its coefficient is not significant (cf. also Berry et 
al. 2012). After all, the insignificant coefficient in Table 2 only indicates that our 
interaction effect is not significant on average. The results, illustrated in Figures 4a-b, are 
very similar to the ones we previously presented concerning left-wing populist party 
support. 
 
Figure 4a indicates that, on average, populist attitudes moderate the effect of cultural 
policy preferences on the support for right-wing populist parties. Similar to Figure 3a, it 
shows that the AME of cultural policy preferences on the probability to support a right-
wing populist party goes to zero as populist attitudes increase. To further clarify this 
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general observation, we once again plot the predicted probabilities.18 Figure 4b indicates 
that the absolute effect of cultural policy preferences on the predicted probabilities to 
support a right-wing populist party decreases (i.e. converging predicted probability lines) 
as populist attitudes increase. Furthermore, when individuals’ cultural issue positions are 
located at the far right of the policy scale (i.e. the upper line in Figure 4b), the statistical 
effect of populist attitudes on the probability to support a right-wing populist party can 
no longer be distinguished from zero. In line with our observations for left-wing populist 
party support, we do not find evidence that populism conditions the effect of policy 
preferences on right-wing populist party support when an individual’s policy preferences 
are very conservative. Similar to left-wing populist party support, both of these 
observations reiterate the importance of policy considerations for some voters, and the 
value of populist attitudes as a ‘motivational substitute’ for others.  
 
In sum, while we theoretically reject hypotheses 4a and 4b, our results do show that – on 
average and for a large part of respondents – populist attitudes interact with issue 
positions on populist party support. This effect, however, is opposite to what we 
expected and is not uniform across our sample. Neither among left- nor right-wing 
populist party supporters do we find statistical evidence that individuals at the far 
economic left and far cultural right are motivated mainly by populist attitudes. Instead, 
they appear primarily policy-driven. At the same time, individuals further removed from 
these extreme issue positions may still be pulled to the populist party due to their strong 
populist attitudes. A left-wing populist party may still tempt more economically right-
leaning individuals if these are characterised by strong populist attitudes. Vice versa, 
right-wing populist parties may be able to win the support of certain culturally left-
leaning voters, as long as these are strongly populist.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Previous studies have shown that populist party supporters are typically dissatisfied with 
the political establishment, but also attracted by such parties because of their more 
concrete policy-related arguments. More research is required, however, to answer the 																																																								
18 We visualise three interesting levels of policy preferences, namely the mean minus two standard 
deviations (left-wing cultural policy preferences), the mean (centrist cultural policy preferences) and the 
mean plus two standard deviations (right-wing cultural policy preferences). Further investigations lead us 
to conclude that populist attitudes only matter for respondents with cultural policy preferences greater than 
eight on our 11-point scale (see also Appendix V, Figure V.2). 
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questions of whether populist party supporters also share populist affinities, and whether 
populist attitudes can be considered important as a predictive mechanism of the 
(populist) vote. While existing studies have assessed populist attitudes in several 
populations across the Americas and Europe (e.g. Flanders, the Netherlands, Slovakia), a 
cross-national study on this topic is still lacking. What is more, except for one case study 
of Slovakia (Stanley 2011), the existing literature does not tackle the question of whether 
populist attitudes can possibly motivate people to support populist parties.   
 
In our study, we aimed to fill these gaps in the literature. We used cross-sectional survey 
data from nine European countries to perform a cross-national analysis of populist 
attitudes and issue positions, which we related to populist party support. From our 
findings, we come to three core conclusions. First, in line with single-country studies, we 
conclude that populist attitudes are particularly strong amongst the prospective voters of 
populist parties. Compared with traditional party constituents, the overall levels of 
populist attitudes among populist party supporters are particularly high.  
 
Second, populist attitudes are significant predictors of the support for both left- and 
right-wing populist parties. These findings thus suggest that the ideas associated with 
populism have electoral relevance. This, in turn, implies that it is important to treat 
populism as an essential element of (i) individuals’ behavioural voting mechanisms, and 
(ii) a populist party's broader ideology. Given that previous studies have indicated that 
populist attitudes are quite widespread among electorates, supply-side expressions of 
populism may indeed be of considerable electoral and strategic value.  
 
Third, in line with existing research, we find that policy-oriented preferences or issue 
positions provide alternative explanatory mechanisms for populist party support. 
Additionally, we found evidence that populist attitudes interact with issue positions, 
although not quite in the manner we expected. This applies to both left- and right-wing 
populist party supporters: the effect of populist attitudes on the support for left- and 
right-wing populist parties is less pronounced for individuals with strong economically 
left-leaning and culturally right-leaning preferences, respectively. In other words, populist 
attitudes matter less (to the point of not mattering at all) as the economic or cultural 
issue positions of individuals become more extreme, and thus supposedly more 
congruous with those of populist parties at the fringes of the political spectrum. Our 
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findings also suggest that some voters who are further removed from the issue positions 
of populist parties may still be attracted by these parties if they have strong populist 
attitudes. This implies that it may be electorally rewarding for a political party to adopt a 
populist discourse or ideology in an attempt to attract populist individuals who do not 
necessarily agree with its more concrete policies.  
 
In sum, throughout this study, we make a number of important contributions to the 
study of populism, as well as the broader linkage between demand- and supply-side 
politics. First, while our findings are in line with a number of existing studies, we 
examined the effect of populist attitudes as a comprehensive construct, rather than 
interpreting populism as mere anti-establishment feelings. In other words, by means of 
our empirical study, we are able to find support for the argument that populist attitudes 
are unique and distinct from other behaviours such as protest or dissatisfaction.  
 
Second, we provide evidence that issue positions play an important role in the support 
for populist parties. This would suggest that traditional and populist electorates are, to a 
certain extent, driven by similar motivations. This, in turn, implies that populist parties 
are more than just vehicles for an uninformed and apathetic protest vote. Third, we 
distinguish between left- and right-wing populist parties and show that there are 
important differences in the characteristics of their supporters. At the same time, we 
have found that issue positions and populist attitudes interact in a similar way when 
explaining the support for left-wing populist parties, on the one hand, and right-wing 
populist parties, on the other.  
 
Finally, while most existing studies on demand-side populism are limited in their 
geographical scope or inferential abilities, we have been able to provide a unique cross-
national analysis. While we need to be careful with the inferences drawn from this cross-
sectional design, our initial evidence supports original theoretical claims, and provides 
cross-national information that should stimulate additional analyses. For one, some of 
the descriptive analyses in this study indicate heterogeneity in populist attitudes across 
countries, which certainly provide an interesting scope for further research. We 
recommend in particular that future research examines to what extent our initial evidence 
is time- and country-specific. Future studies should also seek to employ broader cross-
sectional, longitudinal or experimental research designs. This would also demand 
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developing further the measurement of core concepts in this study, most notably 
populist attitudes.  
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Table 1: Question wording populism items 
 
LIVEWHAT 
items  Description  
popatt1 The politicians in [country] need to follow the will of the people 
popatt2 The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions 
popatt3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people 
popatt4 I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician 
popatt5 Elected officials talk too much and take too little action 
popatt6 What people call “compromise” in politics are really just selling out one’s principles. 
popatt7 The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of              the people 
popatt8 Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges. 
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Table 2: Fixed-effect logistic models, with interaction terms 
 
    Coef. Std. 
Err. 
OR Std. 
Err. 
left-wing 
populist 
support 
(model 3a) 
cultural policy preferences 
(left-right) 
-.122 (.018)**
* 
.885 (.016)**
* 
economic policy 
preferences (left-right) 
-.169 (.018)**
* 
.844 (.015)**
* 
populist attitudes .022 (.108) 1.022 (.842) 
economic left-right # 
populist attitudes 
.049 (.017)** 1.051 (.018)** 
            
right-wing 
populist 
support 
(model 3b) 
cultural policy preferences 
(left-right) 
.153 (.015)**
* 
1.166 (.017)**
* 
economic policy 
preferences (left-right) 
.010 (.014) 1.010 (.472) 
populist attitudes .314 (0.094)*
** 
1.369 (.129)**
* 
cultural left-right # populist 
attitudes 
-.022 (.014) .978 (.014) 
 
Note: OR = Odds Ratios (see Appendix IV, Table IV.2 for full models); Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 	
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Figure 1: Average IRT estimation of populist attitudes, per party family 
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects for models 2a and 2b 
 
 
Note: For visual clarity reasons, we did not include party identification or the socio-demographic control 
variables in the Figure. For full models, we refer to Appendix IV, Table IV.1.  	
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Figures 3a-b: The interaction between populist attitudes and issue positions for 
left-wing populist voters  
 
	 	
 
Note: While researchers most commonly put the moderator on the x-axis, we recognise this can be a 
matter of taste or preferences. With that in mind, we include the marginal effect plots with policy 
preferences on the x-axis in Appendix V. These plots further confirm and illustrate our findings. 
Note: The graph represents the average marginal effect of economic policy preferences on the likelihood 
to support a left-wing populist party. 
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Figures 4a-b: The interaction between populist attitudes and issue positions for 
right-wing populist voters  
 
 
 
Note: While researchers most commonly put the moderator on the x-axis, we recognise this can be a 
matter of taste or preferences. With that in mind, we include the marginal effect plots with policy 
preferences on the x-axis in Appendix V. These plots further confirm and illustrate our findings. 
Note: The graph represents the average marginal effect of cultural policy preferences on the likelihood to 
support a right-wing populist party. 
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Appendix I: Party family classification 
 
Table I.A: National parties per party family 
  party family country party 
1 Socialists France PS: Parti Socialiste 
   France PRG: Parti Radical de Gauche 
   Germany SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
   Greece PASOK 
   Greece To Potami (The River) 
   Greece Kinima Dimokraton Sosialiston 
   Italy Partito Democratico 
   Poland SLD — Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 
   Poland Twój Ruch 
   Spain PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
   Switzerland Parti socialiste (PS) 
   UK Labour 
2 Liberals Germany FDP - Freie Demokratische Partei 
   Italy Unione Democratici di Centro e Nuovo Centro 
Destra 
   Poland Nowoczesna PL 
   Spain Ciudadanos 
   Spain UPyD - Unión Progreso y Democracia 
   Spain CiU - Convergència i Unió 
   Sweden Centerpartiet 
   Sweden Folkpartiet liberalerna 
   Sweden Socialdemokraterna 
   Switzerland Libéraux-Radicaux (PLR) 
   UK Liberal Democrat 
3 Christian 
democrats 
France MoDeM: Mouvement Démocrate 
   Germany CDU/CSU  
   Greece New Democracy  
   Poland Kristdemokraterna 
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   Switzerland Parti démocrate-chrétien (PDC) 
   Switzerland Parti évangélique Suisse (PEV) 
4 Conservatives France UMP: Union pour un mouvement populaire 
   France MPF: Mouvement Pour la France 
   Italy Fratelli d’Italia 
   Poland PO — Platforma Obywatelska 
   Spain PP - Partido Popular 
   Sweden Moderata samlingspartiet 
   Switzerland Parti bourgeois démocratique (PBD) 
   UK Conservative 
5 Right-wing 
populists 
France FN: Front National 
   Germany AfD - Alternative für Deutschland 
   Italy Forza Italia 
   Italy Lega Nord 
   Poland PIS — Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
   Poland Ruch Pawła Kukiza 
   Sweden Sverigedemokraterna 
   Switzerland Union démocratique du centre  (UDC) 
   UK UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
   UK British National Party (BNP) 
6 Left-wing 
populists 
Germany Die Linke 
   Greece SYRIZA 
   Italy Movimento 5 Stelle 
   Spain Podemos 
7 Other parties France EELV: Europe Écologie – Les Verts 
   Germany NPD - Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands 
   Germany Piratenpartei 
   Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
   Greece Golden Dawn 
   Greece KKE 
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   Italy Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà 
   Italy Radicali Italiani 
   Poland PSL — Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
   Poland Miljöpartiet de gröna 
   Spain ERC - Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
   Spain IU - Izquierda Unida  
   Sweden Vänsterpartiet 
   Switzerland Parti Suisse du Travail (PST) 
   Switzerland Parti écologiste Suisse (Les Verts) 
   Switzerland Parti vert’libéral (PVL) 
   UK Green Party 
   UK Scottish National Party 
   UK Plaid Cymru 
Note: The original ZEUS classification includes communist parties, socialists, liberals, 
Christian democrats, conservatives, extreme right and nationalist parties, regionalist 
parties, environmentalist parties, agricultural parties and ‘other’ parties. We reduce this 
classification by harmonising communists, regionalists, environmentalists, agricultural 
and other parties into the category ‘other’. We exclude those individuals who indicated 
they did not know who they would vote for if there were an election tomorrow (coded as 
missing). Category 8 includes those individuals who did not know for which party they 
would vote 
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Table I.B: Absolute number of party family supporters, per country 
 
  Socia
lists 
Liber
als 
Chris
tian 
dem
ocrat
s 
Conser
vatives 
Righ
t-
wing 
popu
lists 
Left-
wing 
popu
lists 
Othe
r 
parti
es 
don't 
know 
Total 
France 317 0 84 311 392 0 171 303 1,578 
Germany 341 88 464 0 126 251 337 147 1,754 
Greece 132 0 155 0 97 761 445 312 1,902 
Italy 330 24 0 48 341 539 161 297 1,740 
Poland 96 96 0 495 874 0 44 172 1,777 
Spain 272 355 0 300 0 423 239 236 1,825 
Sweden 0 473 49 331 468 0 283 258 1,862 
Switzerland 285 183 106 77 420 0 232 259 1,562 
UK 520 110 0 654 230 0 247 142 1,903 
          
Total 2,293 1,329 858 2,216 2,948 1,974 2,159 2,126 15,90
3 
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Table I.C Average populist attitudes per party family, per country 
 
 
Note: Average values of populist attitudes are portrayed on the X-axes. The vertical red 
line on each graph represents the country average of populist attitudes.   
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 45 
Appendix II: Question wordings 
The economic issue positions index is comprised of the following five statements: 
1. Incomes should be made more equal | We need larger income differences as 
incentives. 
2. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves | The 
government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for. (reverse coded) 
3. People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their 
unemployment benefits | People who are unemployed should have the right to 
refuse a job they do not want. (reverse coded) 
4. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas | 
Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people. (reverse coded) 
5. Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits 
and services | Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on 
social benefits and services. (reverse coded) 
 
The cultural issue positions index is comprised of the following five statements: 
1. A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled | A woman can be fulfilled 
through her professional career. (reverse coded) 
2. A woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free 
and safe abortion | Abortion should not be allowed in any case. 
3. Children should be taught to obey authority | Children should be encouraged to 
have an independent judgment. (reverse coded) 
4. People who break the law should get tougher sentence | Tougher sentences do 
not contribute to reduce criminality. (reverse coded) 
5. Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children| Homosexual couples 
should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances. 
 
The subjective deprivation variable is a combination of the following five items: 
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much 
better', would you say that your own current standard of living is better or worse 
compared to your parents when they were your age? 
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much 
better', would you say that the economic situation of your household now is 
better or worse to how it was 5 years ago? 
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much 
better', would you say that the economic situation of your household now is 
better or worse than it was 12 months ago? [ 
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much 
better', would you say that over the past year the state of the economy in 
COUNTRY has become...? 
o The living conditions among European countries differ quite a lot today, and we 
would like to get your personal evaluation. Please use the scale below, where 0 
means 'Very bad living conditions' and 10 means 'Very good living 
conditions'.<br/> Where on the scale do you place your country? 
 
The political trust variable is a combination of the trust in 1) national parliament, 2) 
politicians, 3) political parties, 4) the European Union, 5) trade unions, 6) the judicial 
system, 7) the police / the army, 8) the media, 9) national government, and 10) banks. All 
answer categories range from 0 (do not trust this institution at all) to 10 (completely trust 
this institution). 
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The internal political efficacy variable combines the following three items: 
o I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 
agree strongly] 
o I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues 
facing the [COUNTRY] [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly] 
o I think that I am at least as well-informed about politics and government as most 
people [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly] 
 
The external political efficacy variable combines the following three items: 
o Public officials don’t care much what people like me think [1 = strongly disagree 
; 5 agree strongly] 
o People like me don’t have any say about what government does [1 = strongly 
disagree ; 5 agree strongly] 
o Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
can’t really understand what’s going on [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly] 
 
The economic prejudice variable draws from the following question: Would you say it is 
generally bad or good for the COUNTRY’s economy that people come to live here from 
other countries? Please state your answer on this scale where 0 means 'Bad' and 10 means 
'Good'. 
 
The cultural prejudice variable draws from the following question: Would you say that 
the COUNTRY's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to 
live here from other countries? Please state your answer on this scale where 0 means 
'Undermined' and 10 means 'Enriched'. 
 
  
 47 
Appendix III: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table III.A: Absolute number of populist and non-populist supporters, per 
country 
 
  not a 
populist vote 
not a 
populist vote 
(%) 
populist 
vote 
populist 
vote (%) 
Total 
France 1,332 77,26 392 22,74 1,724 
Germany 1,584 80,78 377 19,22 1,961 
Greece 878 50,58 858 49,42 1,736 
Italy 863 49,51 880 50,49 1,743 
Poland 955 52,21 874 47,79 1,829 
Spain 1,376 76,49 423 23,51 1,799 
Sweden 1,292 73,41 468 26,59 1,760 
Switzerland 1,367 76,50 420 23,50 1,787 
UK 1,650 87,77 230 12,23 1,880 
      
Total 11,265 69,46 4,954 30,54 16,219 
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Table III.B: Descriptive statistics of populist attitudes, per country 
 
count
ry 
N mean media
n 
std. 
dev. 
skew
ness 
kurto
sis 
alpha min. max. 
France 2027 0.13 0.10 1.01 -0.28 3.06 0.9053 -3.48 1.81 
Germ
any 
2108 -0.25 -0.31 0.88 0.20 3.19 0.8765 -3.48 1.81 
Greec
e 
2048 0.17 0.09 0.81 -0.08 3.69 0.8245 -3.48 1.81 
Italy 2040 0.25 0.25 0.96 -0.40 3.11 0.8808 -3.48 1.81 
Polan
d 
2024 0.10 0.09 0.94 -0.54 3.90 0.8712 -3.48 1.81 
Spain 2035 0.16 0.18 0.90 -0.34 3.45 0.8639 -3.48 1.81 
Swede
n 
2018 -0.38 -0.52 0.94 0.32 3.32 0.8884 -3.48 1.81 
Switze
rland 
2046 -0.39 -0.43 0.81 0.20 3.87  
0.8426 
-3.48 1.81 
UK 2022 -0.27 -0.31 0.86 0.26 3.10 0.8604 -3.48 1.81 
          
Total 18368 -0.05 -0.08 0.94 -0.06 3.08 0.8753 -3.48 1.81 
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Table III.C: Descriptive statistics 
  
var name n mean std dev min max 
gender (0 = male) 18368 0.53 0.50 0 1 
age 18368 44.46 14.89 18 95 
age squared 18368 2198.23 1370.51 324 9025 
education group (1 = less than 
secondary; 2 = secondary; 3 = 
university) 
18368 2.08 0.74 1 3 
income (brackets) 15630 4.81 2.74 1 10 
social class (0 = lower class; 6 = 
upper class) 
16864 3.10 1.10 1 6 
household size 18079 2.61 1.35 0 15 
marital status (1 = never married, 
civil partnership, legally separated, 
legally divorced, widowed, 6 = 
legally married) 
18368 3.65 2.22 1 6 
subjective domicile (1 = big city; 5 
= farm) 
18368 2.50 1.17 1 5 
economic prejudice (0 = low ; 10 = 
high) 
17364 5.15 2.85 0 10 
cultural prejudice (0 = low ; 10 = 
high) 
17293 4.88 2.94 0 10 
subjective deprivation* 16471 5.98 2.31 0 100 
social trust (0 = low ; 10 = high) 17727 4.25 2.64 0 10 
political trust (0 = low ; 100 = 
high)** 
16588 5.42 2.52 0 100 
political interest (1 = low ; 5 = 
high) 
18368 2.81 0.90 1 5 
internal political efficiacy (0 = low ; 
100 = high)*** 
18368 3.39 0.91 0 100 
external political efficiacy (0 = low 
; 100 = high)*** 
18368 3.23 0.84 0 100 
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partisan affiliation (0 = no) 17044 0.81 0.39 0 1 
satisfaction w/ democracy (1 = low 
; 11 = high) 
17608 5.72 2.62 1 11 
dissatisfaction w/ economic 
policies (0 = low ; 10 = high) 
17609 6.14 2.84 0 10 
dissatisfaction w/ immigration 
policies (0 = low ; 10 = high) 
17551 7.13 2.57 0 10 
culttural left-right 15530 5.06 2.35 0 11.73 
economic left-right 16411 6.41 2.31 0 11.34 
populist attitudes 18368 -0.05 0.94 -3.48 1.81 
Note: * This is the result of a CFA of five separate pocket-book items that indicate 
subjective relative deprivation (alpha = 0.84 and EV = 2.54); ** This is the result of a 
CFA of 10 separate survey items that indicate political trust (alpha = 0.91 and EV = 
5.17); *** Both internal and external efficacy is the result of a CFA of three separate 
survey items that indicate efficacy. 
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Appendix IV: Full model for the populist vote choice models 
 
Table IV.1: Models with socio-demographics only 
  model 1a model 1b 
(coefficients) left-wing 
populism 
right-wing 
populism 
gender -0.013 -0.346*** 
 (0.061) (0.049) 
age -0.003 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
age squared -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
education group 0.081* -0.265*** 
 (0.043) (0.035) 
income -0.038*** -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.011) 
social class -0.209*** -0.028 
 (0.035) (0.025) 
household size -0.008 0.036* 
 (0.025) (0.020) 
marital status 0.005 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
subjective domicile -0.082*** 0.094*** 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
   
Observations 6,031 11,566 
Number of countries 4 8 
LR chi2(9) 99.38 162.73 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -3331.757 -5279.823 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table IV.2: Models with political and attitudinal variables  
 
  
  model 2a model 2b model 3a model 3b 
(coefficients) left-wing 
populism 
right-wing 
populism 
left-wing 
populism 
right-wing 
populism 
social class -0.133***  -0.136***  
 (0.040)  (0.040)  
income -0.046***  -0.045***  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  
gender  -0.103*  -0.104* 
  (0.062)  (0.062) 
education groups  -0.187***  -0.186*** 
  (0.042)  (0.042) 
economic prejudice 0.009 0.047*** 0.008 0.047*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
cultural prejudice -0.050*** 0.178*** -0.049*** 0.177*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
subjective deprivation -0.015 -0.065*** -0.013 -0.064*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) 
social trust 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
political trust -0.096*** -0.015 -0.097*** -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
political interest 0.166*** 0.107** 0.162*** 0.106** 
 (0.050) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045) 
internal political efficacy -0.108** -0.017 -0.102** -0.016 
 (0.051) (0.043) (0.051) (0.043) 
external political efficacy -0.150*** 0.052 -0.155*** 0.050 
 (0.048) (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) 
partisan affiliation 0.861*** 0.905*** 0.859*** 0.904*** 
 (0.115) (0.111) (0.114) (0.111) 
satisfaction w/ democracy -0.037** -0.110*** -0.036** -0.109*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
dissatisfaction w/ economic policies -0.010 -0.045*** -0.013 -0.045*** 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) 
dissatisfaction w/ immigration 
policies 
-0.041** 0.160*** -0.039** 0.159*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
cultural left-right -0.123*** 0.147*** -0.123*** 0.153*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) 
economic left-right -0.150*** 0.009 -0.169*** 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) 
populist attitudes 0.302*** 0.181*** 0.023 0.314*** 
 (0.049) (0.041) (0.109) (0.094) 
economic left-right # populist 
attitudes 
  0.049***  
   (0.017)  
 53 
cultural left-right # populist 
attitudes 
   -0.022 
    (0.014) 
     
Observations 4,860 9,767 4,860 9,767 
Number of countries 4 8 4 8 
LR chi2(17) 488.03 1278.01 496.16 1272.60 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood  -2527.046 -3678.411 -2522.995 -3677.183 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix V: Marginal plots for the interaction terms, with policy preferences as 
the moderator 
 
Figure V.1 The average marginal effect of populist attitudes on the likelihood to 
support a left-wing populist party, according to economic policy preferences. 
 
 
 
Figure V.1 The average marginal effect of populist attitudes on the likelihood to 
support a right-wing populist party, according to cultural policy preferences. 
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